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PoliticalCompetence,
PoliticalTrust,
and the
of
ActionOrientations
UniversityStudents

MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL
RONALD J.

Buscii

COMPAREDTO MASS PUBLICS IN OTHER NATIONS, a relatively large
number of Americans believe that they are politically competentthat they are able to influence political affairs. And yet, over the
past several years we have witnessed the estrangement of substantial portions of the American citizenry from the political systeman estrangement accompanied by an increase in popular distrust of
government.'

As concepts, political competence and political trust have occu* The authors are indebted to Prof. Sheldon Gawiser for his collaboration
in the design and sampling stages of this research. We are also grateful to the
administrationsof Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland State University, and John Carroll University, and especially to Thomas A. Campbell, Jack
A. Soules, and Eugene S. Uyeki. We benefited from the comments and suggestions of Thomas A. Flinn, C. Richard Hofstetter, Brian D. Silver, and
Robert Weissberg.

1 Arthur H. Miller, Thad A. Brown and Alden F. Raine, "Social Conflict and
Political Estrangement, 1958-1972" (paper presented at the annual meeting of
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., May 3-5, 1973); and
Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Government Information Policy," Public Opinion
Quarterly,35 (Winter/Spring 1971-72), 636-651.
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pied significant positions in our models of mass political behavior
and in our theories about the political system, and more recently
the combination of these variables has attracted the attention of a
number of scholars. Much of the research has shown that Americans who exhibit a sense of political competence tend also to trust
the national government, a situation that contributes to the stability
of the political system.2 When highly competent people lose confidence in their government, there is good reason to expect an increase in social disruption and political violence. Among some
subcultures-for example, black residents of ghetto communitiescertain evidence indicates that politically competent low trusters
were more likely to riot than others.3 In such subcultural groups,
however, it is unlikely that this combination of competence and
distrust occurs very frequently. Although the level of political
trust among blacks may be low, the belief that one can influence
political outcomes is less widespread than in the general public.4
On the other hand, within some groups we are likely to find a rather
large proportion of highly competent people who distrust the government. An obvious example is the university community. The
social characteristics of college students are conducive to feelings
of personal and political competence, but at the same time many
students have demonstrated a lack of faith and confidence in government. To explore the consequences of this mixture of high
competence and low trust, the present study examines these variables as they are related to the action orientations of university
students.
2 Richard L.

Cole, "On the Causes and Consequences of Political Trust: A
Causal Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., April 28, 1972). See also Cole's
"Toward a Model of Political Trust: A Causal Analysis," American Journal
of Political Science, 17 (November 1973), 809-817.
3 William Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications,"in Social Psychology and Political Behavior: Problems and Prospects, ed. Gilbert Abcarian and
John W. Soule (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1971),
40-55.
4 Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black
Schoolchildren: Two Explanations,"Journal of Politics, 34 (November 1972),
1,243-1,275. Also see Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes
and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1966), 275-280.
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Preliminary to our empirical analysis, we here introduce the two
concepts that serve as a foundation for that which follows.
Trust in Government
Although one finds serious discrepancies if not contradictions in
the literature on the origins of people's trust in government, the
process whereby it is diffused, and its consequences for political
behavior, general agreement on the importance of trust for the
political system seems to exist. It promotes legitimacy; it is conducive to system stability; and it provides discretionary power for
political elites.5 As many have observed, all regimes strive to es5Most empirical research devoted to the concept of political trust can be
divided into studies that examine the correlates of trust as a dependent variable and those that characterize trust in government as an independent variable
influencing citizen attitudes and behavior. Depending on the characteristics of
the setting and population under study, political trust has been found to covary
with social trust, age, education, income, sense of political efficacy, political
alienation, a general feeling of deprivation, citizen expectations about treatment
from government officials, level of alertness to external danger, strength of
drive to self-assertion, and race. Does it make any difference, however, if the
citizenry or significant portions thereof, is trusting of the institutions and
actors of the political system? Those interested in this question have found
political trust to be related to voting turnout, the direction of the vote, voting
for extremist candidates, dissatisfaction with policy outcomes, a willingness to
violence or coercive and demonstrative behavior, and an attachment to salient
political structures in the society. Among the more relevant publications, see
Joel D. Aberbach, "Alienation and Political Behavior," American Political Science Review, 63 (March 1969), 86-99; Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," American Political Science Review, 64 (December 1970), 1,199-1,219; Abramson, "Political Efficacy," 1,243-1,275; Robert
E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley Pearl, "Political Cynicism:
Measurement and Meaning," Journal of Politics, 23 (August 1961), 477-506;
George I. Balch, "Political Trust and Styles of Political Involvement Among
American College Students" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., April 29-May 1, 1971);
Cole, "Causes and Consequences"; John Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious
Hypothesis and Political Participation," Journal of Politics, 32 (May 1970),
444-449; Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 40-45; Martin Kraus,
Kevin Houlihan, Mark I. Oberlander, and Lawrence Carson, "Some Motivational Correlates of Attitudes Toward Political Participation," Midwest Journal
of Political Science, 14 (August 1970), 383-391; Edgar Litt, "Political Cyni-
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tablish a basis of authority independent of coercive force, and to
instill in the populace an abiding sense of trust and allegiance.
Since a marked decline in trust may encourage instability or "immobilism," mechanisms exist in all political systems to engender
trust in political actors, processes, and institutions.
To the extent that political trust is associated with interpersonal
(social) trust, there are additional ramifications for political life.
Group political behavior presupposes a willingness to co-operate.
Broadly based coalitions in the political system, dependent as they
are on agreement that cuts across extant cleavages and opinions,
often require of their adherents a belief in the integrity, ability, or
correctness of one set of political objects as opposed to others.
When intracoalitional trust deteriorates, existing intercoalitional
arrangements may become fragile if not altered. Though interpersonal trust may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for social co-operation-indeed, under certain conditions distrust
may stimulate co-operation among those with similar feelings-it
seems clear that social trust facilitates collective action and probably also increases the likelihood of that action becoming routine
over time.6
Political Competence
While some minimal level of citizen trust in government is essencism and Political Futility," Journal of Politics, 25 (May 1963), 312-323;
Edward L. McDill and Jean Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation and Political Participation,"American Journal of Sociology, 68 (September 1968), 205-213; Edward N. Muller, "The Representation of Citizens by
Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support," American Political
Science Review, 64 (December 1970), 1,149-1,166; Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr.,
and George Taylor, "Pre-Adult Attitudes Toward Legal Compliance: Notes
Toward A Theory," in Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, ed. Dan Nimmo
and Charles Bonjean (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1972), 215-227;
Donald E. Stokes, "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment," in Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political
and Military, ed. Harland Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), 61-73; Meredith W. Watts, "Efficacy,Trust, and Orientation Toward Socio-Political Authority: Students' Support for the University,"
American Journal of Political Science, 17 (May 1973), 282-301.
6 For a more detailed
statement of how hostility and distrust functions for
group life, see Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The
Free Press, 1956), pts. 2 and 5.
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tial to long-term regime success, the significance of political competence varies with the value placed on the role of "citizen" in
public affairs. In a society committed to popular rule, a widely
shared sense of political competence encourages an aware and
active citizenry and thus allows some influence over the general
direction of public policy. A self-confident and politically involved
populace also serves to protect the public interest, providing a
check against governmental power.7
A strong sense of political competence also appears to have personal dividends. A persistent tradition in American political
thought posits an active and informed citizen role as a vehicle
through which an individual achieves self-fulfillment. The subjectively competent and politically active citizen presumably derives certain psychological gratifications from having involved himself in political life: he acquires a heightened sense of importance
and well-being especially if successful in his endeavors.8 It is
obvious that not all citizens, nor even all competent citizens, engage
in political action, and it may well be that the person who believes
that he is able to influence government, but never tries, also derives
certain benefits.9 While confidence in one's political acumen and
abilities may provide a set of highly positive and functional beliefs,
7 In political communities that are not committed to free and meaningful
citizen participation, a politically competent citizenry may be eufunctional, if
not dysfunctional, to the political order. See, however, Frederick C. Barghoorn,
Little, Brown & Co., 1966); and James H.
Politics in the USSR (Boston:
Oliver, "Citizen Demands and the Soviet Political System," American Political
Science Review, 63 (June 1969), 465-475, for alternative interpretations.
8 This is but one aspect of the humanistic and naturalistic philosophy raised
most forcefully by John Dewey and continued in the action-oriented psychology
dedicated to the idea that a man is what he does and becomes by doing. Its
political component has a heritage reaching back to the ideals of an active
citizenry characterized in the Greek city state. See H. Mark Roelofs, The

Tension of Citizenship: Private Man and Public Duty (New York: Rinehart
& Co., Inc., 1958).
9 If they are unsuccessful in political life, there are those who would minimize the significance of the outcome in order to avoid' the feeling of failure.
Apparently there exists a cost-benefit ratio by which the citizen attains sufficient
value satisfactions from having participated, albeit in a losing effort, to offset
the attendant cost of having engaged in the first place. For example, investigators in the Elmira study found that losing partisans tended to play down
the impact of the election, thus reducing personal costs in their unsuccessful
Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee,
venture.
University of Chicago Press, 1954).
Voting (Chicago:
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inactivity avoids a variety of "costs," including the possibility of
frustration due to failure.10
The Competence-Trust Relationship
The political trust and political competence literature is extensive, yet social scientists have only begun to examine the interrelationship between these two variables. With Gamson's illuminating
theoretical discussion of the subject as a basis, one can postulate a
series of behavioral consequences that result from the fusion of
trust and political competence.1" The first combination, a low
level of political trust and a limited sense of political competence,
characterizes the apathetic, indifferent spectator who is minimally
involved in political life. Those who possess this same low level of
10 Scores of studies suggest a relationship between one's sense of effectiveness in political life and a wide array of politically-relevant attitudinal and
behavioral variables. These are far too numerous and too well known to require review here. These studies have been accompanied by equally ambitious
efforts to develop valid and reliable measures of political efficacy. Much of
our scholarship has been based on either the Survey Research Center's fouritem efficacy scale, whose referents are the citizen's belief in the receptivity of
government to citizen influence and his sense of political self-confidence, or the
somewhat broader view of this motivating force as conceived by Almond and
Verba. Their study included in its five-item scale of political competence not
only the dimension of governmental responsiveness but also the informational
base that is considered to be prerequisite to effective political action and the
confidence in oneself that is required as a stimulus to action. Hence, the belief that government is responsive to personal influence further implies (1)
that the individual possesses the amount and kind of knowledge that is adequate
for directing his political claims and grievances to the proper authorities; and
(2) that he feels sufficiently confident in his ability to succeed when circumstances make it necessary or desirable for him to become involved. See
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.;
Princeton University Press, 1963); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren
Row, Peterson and Co., 1954); Angus
Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston:
Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American
Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Ada Finifter, "Dimensions of
Alienation," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), 389-410; Edward Muller, "Cross National Dimensions of Political Competence," American
Political Science Review, 64 (September 1970), 792-809.
11 In his discussion of the consequences of the trust-efficacy combination,
Gamson draws on his previous work in this area and on the dissertation of
Jeffrey Paige. Although Gamson deals with political efficacy, his use of the
concept "efficacy" is consistent with the term political competence as employed
in this research. See Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 40-55;
and also his Power and Discontent, 42-52.
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competence but who feel a strong allegiance to the political system,
constitute a second type which is similar to the subject orientation
portrayed by Almond and Verba. Bound by an attachment to
symbols of nation and community, the extent of this group's engagement in political life is often constrained by an excessive respect for the law and a restricted sense of personal rights and privileges. The third combination, a mixture of political competence
and confidence in government, meets the civic ideal, supporting
active political involvement, yet at the same time staying within the
bounds of social convention.
And finally, a sense of political competence coupled with low
trust provides the potential for political action, but of a highly
volatile sort. A feeling of competence merged with distrust affects
not only the likelihood of political participation but also the means,
for should one's beliefs in the possibility for mass political influence
be juxtaposed with a belief that government is unresponsive to certain interests, the very legitimacy of the regime may eventually be
called into question. Depending in part, then, on the extent of
political competence and on the intensity of the conviction that the
system is not responding as it should, one can suggest those resulting conditions that nurture within-system tensions and encourage system instability. They include withdrawal of support by a
significant segment of the population; discontinuity in support;
fragmentation in existing political coalitions; and polarization.12
Alternatively, when government is viewed as responsive to citizen
inputs and willing to channel public resources in directions indicated by those inputs, allegiant orientations that broaden the extent
of diffuse support are encouraged.
Empirical research has shown that trust and competence are
linked to one another, but the character of the association between
these two variables and their relationship to various forms of political behavior need to be further explored.13
12

Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York:

The Free Press, 1962),

448.
13
Gamson reports data collected by Paige as corroborative evidence for his
typology. Studying black residents of Newark in the aftermath of the 1967
disturbances in that city, Paige found that low trusters were no more likely
than others to have engaged in riot-related behavior. However, when political efficacy (measured by a political information item) and trust are examined together, the findings are compelling: persons with high efficacy and
low political trust constitute the group most likely to have engaged in riot
behavior; persons with a medium level of trust and high efficacy constitute
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HYPOTHESES

The literature on trust and competence treats a number of
theoretically important problems, among them, the relationship between interpersonal and political trust;14 the extent of trust and
competence within select publics;15 the relationship between political trust and political competence;16 and the impact of trust and
competence on behavior and behavioral predispositions.17 This
the group most likely to have engaged in conventional civil rights activities;
and those with both a high level of trust and a high sense of efficacy constitute the group most likely to have limited their political activity to the
ballot box. "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 40-55. In an ambitious and
thorough empirical treatment of the trust phenomenon, Aberbach and Walker
report moderately strong correlation coefficients between trust and three indices of political expectations, among them, political competence (Gamma=
Trust is also found to constrain
.40 for blacks; Gamma = .32 for whites).
the respondent's "potential political behavior" in race-related matters, but
Aberbach and Walker make no effort to link directly the three variables of
competence, trust, and behavior. "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,2051,207. Cole, conducting a secondary analysis of the 1970 SRC national sample,
did test for causal linkages in a political trust model incorporating nontraditional modes of political behavior. Again, a very strong relationship is obtained between political efficacy and political trust (Gamma = .55), but when
the combined impact of efficacy, trust, and other variables is considered, the
"model fails to account for as handsome a percentage of the 'non-conventional'
tactic sympathy as one would expect." "Causes and Consequences," 19.
14Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959), 163166; Agger, Goldstein and Pearl, "Political Cynicism," 477-506; Almond and
Verba, Civic Culture, 248-288; Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political
Ideology," American Sociological Review, 21 (December 1956), 690-695; Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,204-1,205; Litt,
"Political Cynicism," 315; Cole, "Causes and Consequences," 9-11; Aberbach,
"Alienation," 92.
15 Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust," 1,244; Aberbach and
Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,203-1,204; Watts, "Efficacy,
Trust," passim; Miller, Brown and Raine, "Social Conffict," passim; Litt, "Political Cynicism," 312-323; McDill and Ridley, "Status, Anomia," 206-210.
16 Aberbach, "Alienation," 92; Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and
Racial Ideology," 1,205-1,207; Abramson, "Political Efficacy," 1,244; Cole,
"Causes and Consequences," 11-12; Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious Hypothesis," 444-449; Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 46-52;
Brett W. Hawkins, Vincent L. Marando and George A. Taylor, "Efficacy, MisFindings From Additional Data and Inditrust and Political Participation:
1971), 1,130-1,136; Stokes, "Popular
33
(November
Politics,
cators," Journal of
Evaluations of Government," 67.
17 Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,213-1,219;
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literature suggests the following hypotheses, as applied to a university population.
(1) College students as a group will exhibit a higher level of
political competence and a lower level of political trust than is
found in the general public.
(2) Students who have trust in government will tend to have
faith in other people.
(3) Students who are politically competent will manifest predispositions to engage in politics.
(4) Those students who are politically competent will tend also
to be trusting of government.
(5) Students who are both politically competent and distrustful
of government will be more open than others to unconventional
political actions.
DATA

Data for examining the interaction of trust and competence were
obtained in the spring of 1972 from a sample of 661 university
students in the Cleveland, Ohio, area. Respondents were selected
on the basis of a serial systematic method (employing a random
start) of all full-time students drawn equally from Case Western
Reserve University, a private high-tuition university, Cleveland
State University, a public, primarily commuter university, and John
Carroll University, a private coeducational university affiliated with
the Jesuit order.18
Cole, "Causes and Consequences," 16-19; Fraser, "The Mistrustful-Efficacious
Hypothesis," 444-449; Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 50-52;
Gamson, Power and Discontent, 42-52; Hawkins et al., "Efficacy, Mistrust,"
1,130-1,136; Kraus et al., "Motivational Correlates," 387-388; Watts, "Efficacy,
Trust," 294-299.
18 A 71-item questionnaire was mailed to respondents on April 27, 1972,
followed five days later with a postcard reminder. Questionnaires numbering
661 were returned, a 55 percent response rate. Of the Case Western Reserve
University sample, 65 percent responded, compared with a 50 percent return
from the two other universities. Three different universities were included in
this study in order to obtain a less homogeneous sample, and to reduce the
likelihood of bias derived from student association with a single campus. These
three universities differ in terms of the social classes from which their students
are drawn as well as in school milieux. A careful inspection and comparison
of sample and population characteristics for sex, race, class standing, and curriculum reveals no significant biases for these variables.
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The principal variables utilized in this report are: interpersonal
trust; political trust; two dimensions of political competence; and
two measures of orientation to political activity.
Interpersonal Trust. To determine whether students' trust in
government is a reflection of a broader trust and confidence in
people, we included in the questionnaire the Survey Research Center's (SRC) adaptation of the Rosenberg Faith-in-People Scale.19
The scale consists of three items in forced-choice format, with
scores combined into a simple additive index.
Political Trust. Trust in government is measured by a commonly
used SRC item, worded as follows:
How much of the time do you think we can trust the government in Washingabout always, most of the time, some of the
ton to do what is right-just
time, or almost never?

Because this question has been put to national samples of Americans since 1958, it allows for observation of national trends and for
comparison of the Cleveland student population with the nationat-large.

20

Political Competence. Students' beliefs about their ability to influence the government are measured by two questions from Almond and Verba's scale of subjective competence.21 The first item
19 The questions are:

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or
you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that
are mostly just looking out for themselves?
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
20 The trust item was scored 1 through 4 with the lowest value assigned
to respondents answering "just about always" (high trust), and the highest
This
value assigned to respondents answering "almost never" (low trust).
question measuring trust in government was also part of a three-item index of
political disaffection along with the following items:
1. Do you believe that there is a "credibility gap" between what the government does and what it says-yes, definitely; yes, probably; no?
2. Do you think that people like you have too little political power, or just
about the right amount?
To permit a comparison of political trust with this index, coefficients for this
index are also presented in Tables 2 and 3.
21 The following were used as indices of political competence:
1. Now suppose that a law were being considered by the Congress that you
considered to be very harmful or unjust. If you made an effort to block
1.
that
2.
they
3.
they
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(referred to as "governmental responsiveness") poses a hypothetical
situation in which Congress is considering legislation that the respondent believes to be "harmful or unjust," and he is asked to
judge the probability of success in trying to block its passage. This
item is followed by a second (referred to as "political self-confidence") asking whether the respondent would himself become involved, that is, if he as an interested citizen would actively oppose
this law. Both competence items serve as indicators of people's
predispositions to engage in political activity. Our use of the two
items separately is consistent with Converse's recent analysis of the
SRC's scale of political efficacy. In what had originally been a unidimensional scale, Converse detects a bifurcation into personal
capabilities and perception-of-system components.22
Orientations to Action. To measure students' orientations to
political action, we determined each respondent's inclination and
ability to specify a plan or strategy for influencing Congress ("Engagement Index") and the mode of action called for in the strategy
("Engagement Direction"). These variables are adapted from an
item also appearing in The Five Nation Study's subjective competence scale. Almond and Verba asked their respondents what they
could do about undesirable legislation, and a similar question was
put to our sample. We asked, "What methods would you be most
likely to use in trying to persuade Congress that the law it was
considering was harmful or unjust?"
(a) Engagement Index. One way to analyze the responses is to
dichotomize the sample into those who responded to the question
and those who did not (the latter group including respondents who
answered that they would do "nothing"). We hypothesized that
differences between the two groups would be highly correlated with
the dimensions of political competence that are outlined above,
passage of this law, how likely is it that you would succeed:
very likely;
somewhat likely; or not very likely?
2. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually try to do
something about it: very likely; somewhat likely; or not very likely?
22 Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in The Human
Meaning of Social Change, ed. Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), 325-330.
On close inspection of
national trend data, Converse found that the decline in efficacy varied by
education: the less educated were likely to show a decline in personal effectiveness while the better educated seemed to reflect a decline in their evaluations of system responsiveness.
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since providing a method of influence may itself be considered as
one dimension of political competence. In short, people who feel
that the system is responsive and who feel confident in their own
abilities to effect change should be more likely than others to propose some method of action as opposed to thinking that nothing
can be done.
It is clear, however, that most citizens, and especially most university students, have little difficulty in giving some type of answer
to the question that we posed-often, we would assume, without
much thought-and we expected to find the distribution of responses highly skewed. In order to probe one step further, therefore, we asked, "Let's say that the method or methods of persuasion
that you use don't prove successful. Then, what would you be
most likely to do?" Whereas only two percent of the students responded "nothing" to the first question and six percent did not respond at all, 26 percent of all respondents indicated that they
would "give up" if their first attempt failed while nine percent gave
no second answer. With the inclusion of this second item, then, we
increased the size of the group giving partial or incomplete answers
to 43 percent (classified as "low" on the Engagement Index), a result which gave us a much more realistic indication of the proportion of the sample that is least disposed to engage in political action.
(b) Engagement Direction. In addition to information about
the number of alternatives that the respondent can, and is willing
to, devise in order to influence Congress, the same question elicits
information about the kinds of strategies that are being proposed.
Engagement Direction, we hypothesized, would be less highly correlated with political competence than with political trust. Although the efficacious person possesses the kind of outlook that is
psychologically most conducive to political activity per se, the particular method selected is much more likely to be a function of beliefs about the type of behavior that is necessary to bring about
desired outcomes.23 The latter partially reflects an over-all evaluation of the government with which one would have to contend, and
the concept of political trust clearly taps such an orientation.
Accordingly, we coded the answers to our open-ended questions
into "traditional" liberal democratic modes of political influence
(voting, writing to one's congressmen, organizing with others into
23
See Gamson, Power and Discontent, for a more elaborate argument relating political trust to political action, especially pp. 163-183.
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groups, lobbying, and the like), and "nontraditional"political strategies (mass activities, demonstrations, picketing, riots, violence, and
so on). Again, our two-item sequence proved especially useful in
distinguishing between these two styles of political activity. In
responding to the first question, for example, only five percent gave
nontraditional methods. When asked what they would do if their
initial strategy failed, however, 26 percent of this latter group escalated to a nontraditional activity. Of the students who are most
disposed to engage in political action, then, the majority fell into
two categories: those who gave a traditional response to both
questions (33 percent of the total sample; 58 percent of the students scoring "high" on the Engagement Index); and those who
started with a traditional strategy and moved to a nontraditional
one (20 percent of the total sample; 35 percent of students scoring
"high" on the Engagement Index).24
FINDINGS

It is useful to report our findings in the following order: (1) the
incidence of trust and competence among students; (2) the relationship between interpersonal and political trust; (3) the concept
of political competence; (4) the trust-competence relationship; and
(5) the relationship between trust, competence, and orientations to
action.
(1) Comparison Between Students and the General Public. The
SRc provides us with a 15 year time frame for viewing trends in
political trust. As Table 1 makes clear, public confidence in government has consistently declined during the last decade and a half.
To be sure, there are always those who are skeptical about politics, but apparently the concurrence of the Vietnam conflict, the
"credibility gap," and the heightened sense of anxiety over the
direction and pace of social change, has helped to undermine
people's faith in their national government. Students, who have
shown themselves to be especially sensitive to many of these issues,
are even more distrustful of government than the general public.
This above-average level of political mistrust among students, it
24
Only three percent of the total sample can be classified as having proposed alternative methods both of which are unconventional, and one percent
of our students actually "de-escalated" by moving from a nontraditional to a
traditional strategy.
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should be noted, fulfills the first of Gamson's two conditions for
nontraditional political behavior. The second condition relates to
political competence.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON

OF STUDENT

SAMPLE

Political Trust
Year

Meana S.D.

N

AND NATIONAL

Governmental
Responsiveness
Meanb S.D.

SAMPLES

(SRC)

Political Selfconfidence
N

Meanc S.D.

N

1958 (SRC)
1964 (SRC)

2.07
2.08

1966
1968
1970
1972

2.18 .771 1239
2.30 .724 1310
2.39 .743 1461
2.41 .601 2232

2.67 .683 1059
2.41 .752 801

2.59 .843 1162

2.66

2.70

2.27

(SRC)
(SRC)
(SRC)
(SRC)

1972 Cleveland Area
Students

.668
.636

.768

1737
1436

648

.656

647

.785

654

Source: The data utilized in this table were made available, in part, by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The ICPR does not, however, bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.
aScores range from 1 (most trusting) to 4 (least trusting); "it depends"
and "don't know" responses are excluded from the calculations in all categories.
b Scores range from 1 ("high" governmental
responsiveness) to 3 ("low"
governmental responsiveness).
e Scores range from 1 ("high" political self-confidence) to 3 ("low" political
self-confidence).

On the measure of governmental responsiveness, no definite pattern appears, though students are less likely than the general public
to expect success with Congress. When the "it depends" and "don't
know" categories are included in the calculations, the proportion of
students who view the government as unresponsive is markedly
higher than that of the general public.25 Of the students, 71 percent believed it unlikely that they could influence Congress, compared to 58 percent of the public in 1966 and 47 percent in 1968
who thought so. Comparing the respective populations on the secIn calculating the mean scores, "it depends" and "not ascertained" categories were excluded.
This procedure affects the comparison between the
national and student samples on the governmental responsiveness variable
because 18 percent of the national sample can be found in these categories
while only two percent of the students are so situated.
25
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ond dimension of political competence, we find that students are
more politically self-confident. When asked if they would actually
try to influence the Congress, college students responded in the
affirmative more often than others. This higher level of political
self-confidence, then, satisfies the second requirement of the Gamson equation. The implication of these findings will be examined
below.
(2) Interpersonal Trust and Political Trust. It seems reasonable
enough to expect trust in government to be a manifestation of a
more generalized sense of trust in one's fellow man, the arguments
being: a) that political trust represents less of a judgment based
on performance criteria than it does a basic evaluative predisposition or response set, and b) that government consists of people
who hold office, and "if one cannot trust other people generally,
one can certainly not trust those under the temptations of and with
the powers which come with public office."26 Although one can
find some support for this hypothesis,27 a number of studies, including our own, report a conspicuously weak relationship (Gamma
= .15) between interpersonal and political trust.28
Confidence in government bears little relationship to faith in
people, we might suggest, when "government" cannot be substituted for a specific reference group-one that a respondent might
envisage when given the cue "people" in questions asking whether
"most people can be trusted." In part, at least, interpersonal trust
would seem to reflect the kinds of experiences and learning that
take place among immediate cohorts, and these may be different
enough from one's own experiences with the "government in Washington" to modify the impact of what Hess and Torney call "inter26

Lane, Political Life, 164.
In their codification of SRC measures, Robinson et al., report Pearson
product moment correlations of .24 between "trust in people" and "trust in
government" for the 1964 study, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor:
Using 1970 SRc data, a Gamma of
SRC, Institute for Social Research, 1969).
.28 was obtained between "personal satisfaction" and political trust measures
by Cole, "Causes and Consequences," 10. See also Almond and Verba, The
Civic Culture, 248-288; Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," 690695; and Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl, "Political Cynicism," 477-506.
28 Aberbach and Walker report a Gamma of .17 for blacks and .16 for whites,
"Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,206. See also Litt, "Political Cynicism," 315.
27
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personal transfer" as it occurs during early socialization.29 Furthermore, there is evidence to indicate that aggregate levels of
public trust in government have diminished over the past several
years, especially among blacks and students, while no such evidence exists about people's trust in mankind. Since this could
affect the magnitude of the relationship between the two kinds of
trust for these groups, the general hypothesis that faith in people
constrains confidence in government may need to be qualified accordingly.30

(3) Dimensions of Competence. There is a moderately strong
association (Gamma= .35) between governmental responsiveness
and political self-confidence. (See Table 2.) As we might expect,
those who believe that successful influence of Congress is possible
tend to express a companion belief in their own willingness to attempt such influence. That the two competence dimensions are
not more highly associated, however, indicates a degree of independence between these items. Not all students who claim that
they would try to alter legislative outcomes expect to be successful
in their undertaking; likewise, some students who assert high expectations of success with Congress would abstain from any such
effort. We can distinguish, therefore, three types of "political
29 A brief description of the interpersonaltransfer
model of learning is provided by Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney in their study of American
school children, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1968), 24. And since Edward
Banfield, earlier, and Dean Jaros and his colleagues have described subcultures
in two nations, there is some evidence to suggest the utility of the model for
understanding the personal trust-political trust phenomenon. See Banfield,
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958);
and Jaros et al., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture,"American Political Science Review, 62 (June 1968), 564-575.
As appealing as is this thesis for understandingthe relationships between one
set of objects and political attitudes, the transference of learning from one
area to another depends, in large part, upon the substitutability of one set of
objects for another. On this point, see Theodore Newcomb, Ralph Turner,
and Philip Converse, Social Psychology: The Study of Human Interaction
(New York: Holt, Rinehart,and Winston, 1965), 121-149.
30 We find that the correlation coefficient between trust in government and
self-reported conservatism-liberalismstance is Gamma= .50, with those who
call themselves liberals less trusting than conservatives. This result suggests
that for certain groups, such as university students, political ideological variables may be much more relevant to political trust than explanationsbased on
interpersonal trust.
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competents." First is the person who is competent on both of the
above dimensions (23 percent of the sample). A second type consists of people who believe that the system will respond to their
attempts at persuasion but who are not very likely to make an
effort (four percent). And finally, there is the person who is politically self-confident but who thinks that system responsiveness
is unlikely (48 percent). The fact that more students fall into the
third category than into either the first or the second indicates that
among those who are disposed to participate, many are motivated
by something other than their estimate of success with Congress.
TABLE
ASSOCIATION

(GAMMA)

BETWEEN

RESPONSIVENESS,

Governmental Responsiveness
Political Trust
Index of Political Disaffectiona
a

2

POLITICAL

AND POLITICAL

TRUST,

GOVERNMENTAL

SELF-CONFIDENCE

Governmental
Responsiveness

Political Selfconfidence

.24

-.22
-.21

.35
.25

See footnote 20.

(4) Trust and Competence. On the basis of previous studies, we
had expected to find a clear and consistent positive relationship between political competence measures and political trust.31 To the
contrary, results are mixed. (See Table 2.) We find neither an
exceptionally strong association between political trust and dimensions of competence nor a relationship that is consistently positive.
As was anticipated, those who trust the national government are
more likely than others to believe that successful congressional influence is possible, yet the Gamma between trust and governmental
responsiveness is a moderate .24. At the same time, politically trusting students exhibit less of an inclination to take an active part in
such efforts (Gamma=-.22).
Those who distrust the government,
then, are somewhat more likely than their counterparts to say that
they would attempt to influence the legislature.
The most interesting finding here is the negative relationship between trust and political self-confidence. Among other things, it
raises the possibility of reciprocal influence such that a strong
31 Aberbach and Walker, "Political Trust and Racial Ideology," 1,207; Cole,
"Causes and Consequences," 11; Watts, "Efficacy,Trust," 295. See, however,
Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications,"50.
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sense of competence results in political action, and political action
results in a lowering of political trust. Though we are unable to
explore the question of the attitudinal after-effects of political participation, we have some data that indirectly support such an interpretation. We asked the students whether they had ever
worked for a political party or candidate, and the association
(Gamma) between this measure of activity and political trust is
-.21. Those who had participated in partisan activities were more
likely to be low in trust than nonparticipants. While causal direction is uncertain, the possibility exists that political distrust is a
consequence of one's participation in politics, a notion quite inimical to the belief that citizen activity promotes positive orientations
to the system. It is also possible, however, for political distrust to
have stimulated political activity, and in this regard the thesis advanced by William Gamson is most relevant. We address this
topic below.
(5) Strategies for Political Action. For those who are interested
in the relationship between political trust and political competence,
few issues command greater attention than the ties between attitudes about the political system and orientations to action. We
have conceptualized action orientations in two ways: in terms of
one's willingness and ability to articulate political strategies (the
Engagement Index); and in terms of the kinds of tactics that the
individual would find acceptable (Engagement Direction). The
latter, it will be recalled, incorporates a two-phased strategy ranging from traditional methods of influence to nontraditional political
TABLE 3
ASSOCIATION

BETWEEN
(GAMMA)
AND ORIENTATION

Orientation to
Action

POLITICAL
TOWARD

Governmental
Responsiveness

Engagement Index
Engagement Direction

.51

.05

POLITICAL
COMPETENCE,
POLITICAL ACTION

TRUST,

Political
Selfconfidence

Political
Trust

Index of
Political
Disaffection

.35
-.13

.10
.50

.03
.38

action. We have discussed the lack of a strong relationship between political trust and political competence. The relationship
between political trust and the Engagement Index is also weak
(Gamma=.10), evidence that trust is not a good predictor of a
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person's readiness to state a plan for political action. (See Table
3.) Political competence, on the other hand, is more powerful in
its association with the Engagement Index. People who believe
that successful influence is possible as well as those who express
a willingness to attempt such action are more likely than others to
propose political strategies. The respective Gamma values are .51
and .36. Clearly, sense of political competence helps to explain
some of the variation in people's predispositions to engage in political action.
In terms of the direction of engagement, political trust is a much
more potent variable in understanding the kinds of strategies a
person would employ. Whereas weak relationships are obtained
between Engagement Direction and governmental responsiveness
(Gamma=.05) and between Engagement Direction and political
self-confidence (Gamma=-.13), the association between political
trust and Engagement Direction is impressive (Gamma = .50).
While the politically trusting students tend to favor "traditional"
methods of influence, the distrusting are substantially more apt to
select mass demonstrations and protest tactics. This finding is most
interesting in view of the negative relationships between political
trust and political self-confidence, and between political self-confidence and Engagement Direction. Students who express some
confidence in themselves as political actors, then, tend more than
others to distrust the government and to select strategies that incorporate nontraditional tactics. These findings, however, are
based on bivariate relationships between the respective variables,
and it remains to be seen how the mixture of political trust and
political competence affects the direction of political engagement.
Are the less trusting but politically self-confident students in our
sample more likely than their cohorts to designate protest and
sometimes violent methods of political persuasion, as Gamson predicts? The data in Table 4 shows that they are. The frequency
of nontraditional strategies is greatest among those who are most
self-confident and also most distrustful. Of additional importance
is the finding that students who are least politically self-confident
and who are inclined to trust the government tend to limit their
options to a range of traditional political activities like writing
letters, lobbying their representatives, and seeking legal remedies.
Finally, when political trust is held constant, the higher the sense
of political self-confidence, the greater the tendency toward non-
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traditional strategies. Among students, then, the predisposition to
participate is correlated with the predisposition to use methods
intended to challenge system norms. In sum, trust and competence
in combination provide us with a useful indicator of student orientations to political action.
DISCUSSION

Two findings in this study warrant further discussion. The first
is the relationship between political competence and political trust,
and the second is the relationship between these variables and
orientations to political action.
Research devoted to the relationship between trust and competence has provided a mixed pattern of findings, but of late a number of investigators have reported a strong, positive relationship
between the two variables.32 In this study of Cleveland-area university students, another pattern emerges: we obtain neither a
strong nor a consistently positive relationship between political
trust and two dimensions of political competence. Trust is posi32 A few words
are in order about the inconsistencies in the trust-competence literature. Research in this area is quite varied, differing in a number
of important respects. For instance, some investigators have utilized the concept "political competence" while others have used "political efficacy"; different
indicators have been used to measure essentially the same phenomenon; and
trust and competence have been examined in a variety of contexts. To cite
just a few examples, Aberbach and Walker use a six-item index of political
competence, which includes national and local competence items, to study residents of Detroit in "Political Trust and Racial Ideologies"; Watts modifies the
SRc
efficacy items in order to derive an efficacy/powerlessness scale in "Efficacy, Trust," 293; Cole initially uses a single item extracted from the SRC'S
political efficacy scale to study the national electorate in "Causes and Consequences," 11, and subsequently employs the more complete version of the SRC
scale in "Toward a Model of Political Trust," 815; and Paige uses a political
information item as a measure of political efficacy to study black residents of
Newark, in Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," 50. These differences may help to account for the variation in findings: Aberbach and Walker
report a substantial positive relationship between trust and competence; both
Cole and Watts find that efficacy is even more highly correlated with trust;
and Paige observes a slightly negative association between trust and efficacy.
Our own data suggest that there may be significant differences in the trustcompetence relationship depending upon the particular subdimension of competence that is used. Furthermore, our findings based on a student population
are more akin to Paige's data on the black population of Newark than to Cole's
study of the population-at-large.
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tively related to governmental responsiveness and negatively associated with political self-confidence.
In examining the implications of trust and competence for political action, we assumed that the articulation of political strategies was a valid indicator of one's propensity to participate in
politics. This assumption is understandable since strategy articulation implies both a political readiness and some information about
the channels available for political influence. There are two essential decisions that an individual must make: the first is whether or
not to participate; and the second is what direction that participation will take. With respect to the former, the two competence
items proved to be valuable indicators of one's disposition to plan
a strategy. Political trust, on the other hand, provided an indication
of the kinds of political strategies that students were apt to employ: those who trusted the government tended to prefer the more
traditional forms of political action. When trust and competence
are simultaneously examined for their impact on action orientations,
we obtain an even more powerful measure of the direction of these
activities.
Our two most important findings, then, are the negative relationship between trust and political self-confidence, and the association
between distrust and the proposed use of nontraditional political
tactics. Further investigation reveals that politically self-confident
students exhibit a higher-than-average interest in politics, yet they
tend to be low in political trust and are more likely than others to
resort to unconventional political strategies. These data, however,
deal basically with behavioral predispositions. What may be even
more significant, then, is the finding that those who have actually
engaged in partisan political activities are somewhat less trusting
of government than those who have not participated, a fact that
leads us to ask whether for some people participation has a dampening effect on levels of trust. Reciprocal influences may be at
work: high levels of trust are conducive to political activity, but
participatory experiences, in turn, feed back to reduce levels of
trust. If in fact this reduction occurs, it would be appropriate to
consider negative feedback as one of the elements in the generation
of political distrust.
In his discussion of the way in which distrust is diffused through
the political system, Gamson claims that it originates in the citizen's
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negative perception of a set of official decisions. These decisions,
then, cumulate so that initial suspicions come to taint the individual's view of institutions, the regime, and ultimately the political community.33 Our data, however, are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that political distrust is a function of actual participation, as
well as of evaluations of system outputs.
The extent of these negative feedback influences is of special
importance to the United States because an increasing proportion
of the citizenry is becoming better educated, and higher levels of
education are generally associated with feelings of political competence.34 Should participation result in a decline in trust for
some segments of the population, it is quite possible that the volatile
conditions described by Gamson will become more prevalent as ever
larger numbers of politically competent people begin to distrust the
government. If participation in political life were to affect adversely both the individual's political trust and his sense of political
competence, however, then the likelihood of nonconventional activities might not appear so great. Among our respondents, for
example, levels of political competence as measured by governmental responsiveness are especially low. While low levels of trust
and competence discourage the use of nontraditional forms of
political activity, these conditions are equally inappropriate to other
forms of citizen participation. People who lack trust and competence tend to withdraw from, or engage perfunctorily in, political
life.35
As seen in our data, the climate of the university in the early 70s
is one permeated with a distrust of government and a sense of
pessimism about governmental responsiveness. Yet a significant
number of students still exhibit confidence in their personal political
abilities. Ultimately, the importance of these attitudinal patterns
depends upon their durability over time, the continuation of conditions that gave rise to them, and the kinds of opportunities that
will emerge in the future to stimulate the public's participation in
politics.
33 Gamson, Power and Discontent, 51-52; see, also,
Miller, Brown, and Raine,
"Social Conflict," 61-65.
34 Cf. Dean Jaros, "Political Response to New Skills: The Conforming and
the Deviant," in Political Attitudes, ed. Nimmo and Bonjean, 228-236.
35 Cf. Watts, "Efficacy, Trust," 300.
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COMMENTS

Findings such as those discussed above are intriguing in their
ramifications and suggest a number of important questions. How
durable are attitudes of trust and distrust? What level of trust is a
necessary or sufficient condition for the continued stability of democratic government? What are the conditions and circumstances
that facilitate the diffusion or generalization of distrust? And what
are the correlative factors that move people to accept one kind of
political strategy over another?
The long-term impact of student distrust in government remains
to be seen. Although a rather high proportion of students lack
faith in the national government, their distrust may not be as deleterious to the system as some have prophesied. Portions of the student community harbor a generalized rebelliousness toward authority figures which sometimes includes political authorities. Such
hostility, however, need not have dire consequences for the political
system if it is neither central to the person's belief system nor extreme in its intensity. For some, expressions of distrust simply lack
substance, while for others political distrust is without an emotional
anchor. The durability of these opinions as well as their consequences for political behavior remain open questions.
Furthermore, when distrust is highly focused and personalized,
the prospect that generalization will occur from one attitude object
to another is diminished. The belief that "Jones is a corrupt politician" need not lead one to conclude that all politicians are corrupt or that political institutions are no longer reliable. What is
the threshold that must be reached if institutions are to be tainted
by individual culpability? Generalizing from distrust of authorities
to distrust of institutions is equivalent to the identification of individual error with institutional failure. The constraints militating
against such a diffusion of distrust are indeed considerable, compounded by the fact that the burden of guilt for organizational
shortcomings and errors is often displaced onto the individual.36
Partial evidence in support of this distinction between distrust as
a transient opinion and distrust as a more durable and generalized
behavioral cue exists in the number of students who lack confidence
Robert Presthus, "Toward a Theory of Organizational Behavior," in Readings in Public Administration, ed. Maurice E. O'Donnell (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1966), 47.
36
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in government yet remain content to opt for the more traditional
forms of politics. Thus the current low level of political trust among
university students may be a short-term occurrence resulting from
the Vietnam War, domestic unrest, urban blight, and so forth. With
the passage of time and the eventual lessening of those conditions
producing the ebb tide in trust, confidence in government may reemerge to its previous, more robust levels. If so, the finding of a
high incidence of distrust within the student community assumes a
lower order of importance. It is seen as a temporary manifestation
of transitory and idiosyncratic occurrences in the political life of
the nation.
To the contrary, however, a number of factors and conditions
suggest a greater durability to, and importance of, today's standard
of political trust. We have said that the salience of our findings
depends upon the measure to which trust-eroding conditions continue, the degree to which extant attitudes of distrust are reinforced, and the extent to which opportunities for political engagement are ripe. These conditions, taken individually, need not have
pernicious effects for the society. Their occurrence within a brief
span of time, however, makes problematical the assumed resilience
of political trust.
Since these data were collected in 1972, the most relevant political event has been the fuller disclosure of the details of the Watergate affair. Few events in our political history have reached the
enormity of Watergate, with its evidence of political spying, surreptitious entry, politicization of governmental agencies, and campaign sabotage. One thing seems certain. The illegal activities of
the Nixon administration will do much to reinforce the feelings
and beliefs of those who are already distrustful of government.
And for those in the electorate who have been most allegiant in
their political orientations, Watergate is likely to be increasingly
viewed as something more than the ill wind of administrative indiscretion. Whether the threshold point for the diffusion of distrust will have been reached in the aftermath of Watergate remains
a moot issue one dependent, as we have suggested, on the degree
to which blame for these events falls on a number of individuals
rather than on the institutions themselves.
Aside from these reinforcing conditions, a second factor presages
a continuation of low levels of public confidence in government:
developments in the media industry. Combined with an unprece-
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dented availability of information from the news media is the interest in investigative reporting. Developments in media technology have resulted in the widespread and almost immediate
diffusion of information to mass audiences while increased professionalization in the journalism fraternity has encouraged a more
critical scrutiny of public events and official acts.
As larger numbers of politically self-confident, yet distrusting
students involve themselves in social and political affairs, the question of political stability becomes paramount. System stability will
turn on the capacity of government to respond quickly to salient
political issues and problems. The changing composition and
character of the electorate seem to demand a tempo of response
that is without precedent in American political history.

